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here) and should be rewritten. In any event, some kind of integration
of sections 304 and 351 would be in order. The aforementioned diver-
gent alternatives of either complete taxation of the cash at ordinary
rates regardless of gain or loss, or sale or exchange treatment to extent
of "boot" do not present adequate solutions.
Charles J. Goldblum*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PRO-
GRAMS-REVERSE DISCRIMINATION-The Supreme Court of Washington
has held that the University of Washington Law School may, without
any showing of past discriminatory practices on its part, apply separate
and distinct admissions criteria to its minority applicants in order to
achieve a racial balance within the school.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, cert. granted,
94 S. Ct. 538 (1973).
The plaintiff, Marco DeFunis Jr., was a white applicant to the Univer-
sity of Washington Law School for the 197.1-1972 academic year. Pur-
suant to the law school's admissions procedure, plaintiff's credentials
were rated against those of other prospective students, and upon this
basis of competition,' he was ultimately denied acceptance. The appli-
cations of Black, Chicano, and American Indian students, however, were
excluded from the "majority" process, and were analyzed separately. Ad-
missions of students within this preferred "minority" group were
granted without any comparison of their credentials to those of other
0 Special thanks is given by the author of this note to Thomas Arbogast, Esq., Ad-
junct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Member of the law firm of
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. Each applicant's junior-senior collegiate grade point average and Law School Apti-
tude Test (LSAT) scores were combined according to a formula determined by the law
school to yield a "predicted first year average" (PFYA). Plaintiff's PFYA was calculated to
be 76.23 based on his junior-senior grade point average of 3.71; average LSAT score of 582
(on three separate test dates he had received scores of 512, 566, and 668); and average
writing test score component of 61.
Each applicant was placed into one of three categories based upon his or her relative
PFYA. The vast majority of applicants with PFYA's above 77 were accepted; the vast ma-
jority of applicants with PFYA's below 74.5 were reiected; and the students with PFYA's
in the median range along with the applicants from the other two categories who had not
been summarily accepted or rejected, were placed in a separate classification for personal
review by the faculty-student admissions committee. Plaintiff's PFYA score fell within the
parameters of this third category. After personal review of his application, plaintiff was
placed on the lowest priority waiting list and was subsequently denied admission. DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 538 (1973).
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("majority" group) applicants. 2 The consequence of this two-tiered
admissions policy was, according to the more rigid criteria of the
"majority" process, the admission of minority students with lesser quali-
fications than those of the plaintiff and of numerous other "majority"
applicants who had been denied admission.8
Plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court of the State of
Washington for Kings County4 against the University of Washington,
alleging deprivation of rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.5 The court, after a nonjury trial, ruled
that the challenged admissions procedure had violated the fourteenth
amendment, and subsequently ordered the University of Washington
Law School to admit plaintiff to its 1971 entering class.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, 6 the court re-
versed; holding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, as interpreted by the courts, did not preclude classifica-
tions based upon race when such classifications were necessary to re-
dress a racial imbalance in the law school.
7
. The DeFunis court's method of analysis in the area of equal protec-
tion was basically two-fold. Initially, from a survey of Brown v. Board
of Education Js and II,9 and of the numerous public school cases which
resulted from confusion over the Brown mandate, the DeFunis court
2. Applications of students within the specified "minority" dassification were all given
personal review by the admissions committee regardless of the student's PFYA. Subse-
quently, the "minority" students who had the highest potential of success in law school,
asdetermined by the committee, were accepted. 507 P.2d at 1174.
. Thirt-six "minority" students offered invitations to the entering law class had lower
PFYA's than plaiiff, and twenty-nine "maJority" applants who had been rejected had
PFYA's higher than plaintiff's. The trial court had found that some minority students were
accepted with PFYA's so low that had they been white, they would have been summarily
rejected. Id. at 1176.
4. DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741752 (Wash. Super. Ct., Kings Co., Sept. 22, 1971).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in part:
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
6. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
7. As a threshold issue, defendant law school had contended that DeFunis lacked stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of its minority admissions procedure. The plaintiff
had been legitimately placed on the lowest priority waiting list; and thus, the defendant
contended, even if no minority students had been admitted, their positions in the class
most probably would have been filled by "majority" applicants ranked ahead of plaintiff.
The court, noting that there was no absolute method of ascertaining whether plaintiff
would have been admitted to the law school in the absence of the "minority" admissions
process, found that his interest in the adjudication constituted the requisite "personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy" as laid down in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968),
and Baker v. Carr, 362 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter referred to as Brown I].
9. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Brown II].
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concluded that the use of racial classifications is not a per se violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The school desegregation cases, however,
had not dealt with the denial of a "benefit" to any one faction, and thus
there remained the sub-issue of whether such racial stratification could
be adopted when the outcome was discriminatory in effect. Citing sev-
eral cases dealing with discrimination in employment, the court further
concluded that "race is not necessarily a per se violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment if the racial classification is used in a compensatory
way to promote integration."'1
Having thus buttressed itself with these conclusions, the court dis-
pensed with the second major issue-whether the racial considerations
used by the University of Washington Law School could withstand the
traditional "strict scrutiny" test applicable to suspect classifications.'1
Applying this standard of review, it held that the State of Washington
demonstrated a compelling interest in the elimination of "racial im-
balance within public legal education' 2 adequate to justify the racial
classifications connected with its law school admissions policy.
It appears that the Supreme Court of Washington, as evidenced by
its method of analysis, considered DeFunis as falling within the estab-
lished exceptions to strict equal protection as carved out by Brown I
and Brown II and their numerous dependent cases. Such a conclusion,
however, is unfounded. The DeFunis court has not authored a decision
which can comfortably rest within the mainstream of decisional law.
Rather, it has broadened an already vague area of exceptions to four-
teenth amendment equal protection. An analytical survey of the cases
cited within the DeFunis decision will show this to be evident.
Brown I shattered the system of dual public education and fore-
shadowed a period of chaotic upheaval which was finally ignited by
Brown II. Through the Brown decisions, the Supreme Court had pro-
nounced two interdependent mandates for the states to follow. First, it
stated that any system of public education whereby Blacks were segre-
10. 507 P.2d at 1181.
11. Before applying the strict scrutiny test, the court had actually addressed itself to
the preliminary issue of whether the less stringent "rational basis" test could be applied
when racial distinctions are used to redress past discrimination. With little hesitation,
however, it had rejected the use of the "rational basis" test for suspect classifications in any
situation. For discussions generally on the possible use of such lowered standards within
the realm of "benign quota" analysis, see O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the
Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 709-11 (1971); Comment,
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rlv. 1065, 1106-17 (1969).
12. 507 P.2d at 1182.
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gated from the majority of students so stigmatized the minds of the
black children with a feeling of inferiority that they were incapable of
obtaining an equal education no matter how adequate their facilities
may be. The second command of the court, as stated in Brown II, added
the force of law to the sociological conclusion that had been born out
of Brown I. With uncompromising authority, the Supreme Court or-
dered the states to do all that was necessary to carry out the mandate
of its first decision.'3
What followed was a series of cases in which the full significance of
the Brown rulings was slowly exposed. In Green v. County School
Board14 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen berg Board of Education,"
relied upon by the DeFunis court as examples of a non-colorblind ap-
proach to equal protection, the Supreme Court struggled with the
practicalities of creating integrated schools within formerly de jure16
segregated school systems.
In Green, a "freedom of choice" plan of student attendance, pro-
posed by the local school board eleven years after Brown I, was rejected
at that late date as an illusory solution to the problems created by
formerly segregated schools. 17 The Court demanded that affirmative
steps be taken to create an integrated system, the application of which
necessarily implied the use of racially designated classifications.' 8 In
13. The Court, by implication, authorized the use of racial classifications to undo the
effects of dual educational systems. It stated:
To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making
the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional prin-
ciples ....
349 US. at 300.
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
15. 402 US. 1 (1971).
16. De jure segregation has been defined as that which is "... directly intended or
mandated by law or otherwise issuing from an official racial classification." Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 492 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
De facto segregation is that which is brought about inadvertently by social and economic
determinants absent any action by school authorities.
17. The Green Court concluded that the harm of a dual school system would merely be
perpetuated by the continued use of a "freedom of choice" plan when an all black high
school and an all white high school presently existed. There had been no white students
and only a small percentage of black students who had transferred out of their racially
dominated schools in the three years the plan had been in existence. 391 U.S. at 441.
18. The Supreme Court demanded that the burden of a workable system of integration
be shifted from the students to the school board. It stated,
The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses
which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realis-
tically to convert promptly to a system without a "white" school and a "Negro" school,
but just schools.
Id. at 442.
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Swann, the Supreme Court approved a desegregation plan characterized
by significant pupil redistribution based on race.19
In both cases the catalyst of the court's affirmative remedial demands
was the mandatory compliance with Brown IH which had been ignored
by the defendant school districts, i.e., the Supreme Court itself was
requiring classifications of pupils based on racial lines, when those
classifications were needed to overcome the "racial stigmatization" that
Brown I declared had denied "equal protection" to black students in
the area of public education.2 0
These school desegregation cases commanded affirmative action2
on the part of segregated school districts to effect compliance with the
fourteenth amendment, and the ancillary use of racial considerations
to achieve this equality in education was tolerated as an unavoidable
consequence of realistic desegregation schemes. The Supreme Court
had not authorized a carte-blanche use of regulations based upon race;
indeed, it had not even held, contrary to what the DeFunis court in-
ferred, that racial classifications may be tolerated to redress any type
of past discrimination. What the Supreme Court had approved, by im-
plication, was the mere use of court-induced racial classifications when
they were needed to convert former de jure segregated public school
systems into statistically integrated systems. 22
In the realm of judicially induced. desegregation plans, therefore,
19. The Court in Swann explicitly authorized the use of racially induced remedial mea-
sures when it stated:
... one of the principle tools employed by school planners and by courts to break up
the dual school system has been a frank-and sometimes drastic-gerrymandering of
school districts and attendance zones .... [A]s an interim corrective measure, this can-
not be said to be beyond the broad remedial powers of a court.
402 U.S. at 27.
20. As the Supreme Court stated in Swann,
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil struck down by Brown I as contrary to
the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Id. at 15.
21. The term affirmative action can refer to various types of conduct. In the school de-
segregation cases, affirmative action programs were procedures whereby school districts
consciously classified students and student attendance zones along racial lines. In this sense
the term implies an active use of racial classifications.
Affirmative action can also encompass preferential admissions or hiring policies whereby
minority applicants are given some degree of preference by the admitting authority. For a
discussion of the varying degrees of preferential admission policies, see O'Neil, Preferential
Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE I-J.
699, 700 n.3 (1971).
22. Notably, the vast majority of the school desegregation cases handled by the Supreme
Court have involved the use of court-induced classifications to facilitate desegregation. See
Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451 (1972); Davis v. School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1970); Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 US. 450 (1967); Raney
v. Board of Educ., 391 US. 443 (1967); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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the de jure-de facto distinction has maintained significant importance.
The Court in Swann, inhibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 was
compelled to limit its command for affirmative action programs to
school districts which had formerly practiced de jure segregation; 24
and the significance of this distinction was recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court.2 5 Consequently, the use of the fourteenth amendment
as a tool of the courts to impose racial classifications upon recalcitrant
participants has been limited to situations involving past de jure segre-
gation.26
In DeFunis, however, the University of Washington Law School had
not been guilty of any form of discriminationY.2  Indeed, this was not a
case where minority members had brought a suit to promote integra-
tion, but rather one where the law school had voluntarily instigated
methods to "achieve a reasonable representation within the student
body of persons from these groups which have been historically sup-
pressed.28 Therefore, the value of the school desegregation cases as prece-
dents for the DeFunis decision is questionable.
The actual question presented in DeFunis-the permissive use of
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (b) (1970), reads:
"Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but "de-
segregation" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to
overcome racial imbalance.
Id. § 2000c-6, reads, in relevant part:
.. nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another in
order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the
court to insure compliance with constitutional standards.
24. The Court was very careful to distinguish the obligations of the school districts
which had formerly operated under de jure segregation from those which had merely en-
tertained de facto segregation. In rejecting the idea that the Civil Rights Act precluded
any power to instigate affirmative action, the Court stated:
... Congress was concerned that the Act might be read as creating a right of action
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the situation of the so-called de facto segrega-
tion, where racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing that this was
brought about by discriminatory action of state authorities. In short, there is nothing
in the Act that provides us material assistance in answering the question of remedy
for state-imposed segregation in violation of Brown 1.
402 U.S. at 17-18.
25. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In this case, a finding of de jure
segregation within one area of the Denver school system created a prima facie case of dual
education which could only be rebutted by the school district proving that this one school
zone had been separate and distinct from the rest of the system.
26. The term de jure segregation encompasses an expanding concept. It no longer refers
exclusively to segregation that has been sanctioned by state law, but encompasses any con-
duct by school board officials calculated to foster segregation. As the Court stated in Keyes,
"... [The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segre-
gation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate." 413 U.S. at 208.
27. 507 P.2d at 1182-83.
28. Id. at 1175.
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voluntary classifications based upon race-has never been before the
Supreme Court, although a number of lower courts have dealt with
the issue.29 The Supreme Court of Washington relied upon several of
these decisions to justify affirmative action used on a voluntary basis.
In Offerman v. Nitkowski,30 and State ex rel. Citizens Against
Bussing v. Brooks,"' local school boards, responding to deeply en-
trenched de facto segregation within their districts, voluntarily em-
ployed affirmative action programs to deal with the realities of racially
divided schools.32 The Offerman and Brooks courts, as other lower
courts had done, acting without clear Supreme Court guidelines, extrap-
olated the rationale of Brown I and held the voluntary use of racial
classifications to be constitutional in these demanding situations.
The anomaly created by purely de facto public school systems is
unique. Brown I had declared that any public school system in which
Blacks are denied the interchange of ideas with other students, denies
these minority students the opportunity for an equal education. Realis-
tically, therefore, a school district that maintains an all black school
merely because of economic and social determinants, is denying an
equal education to its black students as clearly as a school district which
is segregated by law. The Supreme Court, however, perhaps heeding
the restraint of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 has refused
to demand affirmative action in such a situation; but by declining to
adjudicate the question, it has nonetheless left the door open to volun-
tary acts of desegregation.
When the DeFunis court grasped upon the rationale of Offerman
and Brooks, it failed to recognize the symbiotic relationship that exists
between all of the voluntary desegregation cases and the Brown rationale.
The courts that have allowed bussing and redistricting based upon
racial considerations have done so with the idea that they are fulfilling
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Brown holding.34 Therefore, classifi-
29. Significantly, perhaps, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to several lower
court decisions in the area. See Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 174, 205 N.E.2d 279, 257
N.Y.S.2d 129, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965).
30. 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967).
31. 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
32. In Offerman, the local school district had implemented a plan of voluntary redis-
tricting, while the school board in Brooks had begun bussing students from highly concen-
trated black schools to formerly white schools.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1970).
34. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Washington Itself had seemed to base Its approval
of voluntary affirmative action programs on the kinship between the de facto and de jure
segregated public schools, and the need to provide equal educational opportunities In both
700
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cations based upon race have only been tolerated in those instances
when, as in the school desegregation cases, they are unavoidable conse-
quences of a plan to offer equal educational opportunities to all public
school students. The courts have merely taken the Brown II holding
which regulates de jure segregation in public schools and employed
it in parallel de facto situations.
The compelling state interest in allowing the use of such classifica-
tions is not a general need for better educational opportunities for
minority students, rather it is the specific need to offer such students the
opportunity for education that Brown I and the fourteenth amendment
demand. The DeFunis court did not recognize this limited sphere of
use, and attempted to interpret the string of de facto segregation cases
as validating any use of racial classifications for compensatory purposes.
No public education case has ever ventured so far afield from the con-
fines of Brown.
The DeFunis court also cited various cases which had dealt with
racially motivated employment programs, concluding that they had
authorized the use of compensatory racial classifications even when one
party had been denied a "benefit" by their use. The facts in each of
these cases are distinguishable from those in the DeFunis case; so that
a mere extraction and use of their conclusions is a faulty basis for deci-
sion.
In Carter v. Gallagher,5 a finding of actual past discrimination
within the Minneapolis Fire Department precipitated the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to hold that the limited
use of a quota system for hiring minority applicants was a constitu-
tionally acceptable remedy.36 However, the reluctance of the Gallagher
instances. As the court stated in State ex rel. Citizens Against Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash.
2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972):
Reason impels the conclusion that, if the Constitution supports court directed man-
datory bussing to desegregate schools in a system which is dual "de jure," then such
bussing is within the appropriate exercise of the discretion of school authorities in a
system which is dual "de facto."
Id. at 128, 492 P.2d at 541.
35. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
36. Five persons, representing the whole class of minority applicants who claimed they
had been denied equal protection, filed suit for injunctive relief against the fire depart-
ment. The trial court issued a lengthy injunction ordering the fire department to signifi-
cantly alter its hiring techniques, and most importantly, to immediately implement a
procedure to give "absolute preference" in employment to twenty minority persons who
met the qualifications for the position.
A panel of three federal judges found the use of such racial preference to be in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. At a rehearing before the
court en banc, a limited use of the quota system was reinstated as a proper remedy for
actual past discrimination. One out of every three firemen hired was to be black until
twenty minority firemen existed on the force.
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court to order such relief, even with adequate proof of flagrant discrimi-
nation, coupled with the existence of strong dissents, would seem to
limit the holding of Gallagher to cases where the court itself must
fashion some type of remedy for actual discriminatory practices.37 The
compelling interest in allowing such racially motivated classifications
in employment is, as in the school desegregation cases, the need for
realistic remedial schemes to offset a history of past discrimination, and,
therefore, the use of "benign quotas" or other affirmative programs in
hiring has rather consistently been limited to cases involving evidence
of prior discriminatory offenses.38
In Porcelli v. Titus,39 also relied upon by the DeFunis court, the
Newark New Jersey school board's voluntary reorganization of its pro-
motional lists for administrative positions was held to be constitutional
even though the result was the promotion of minority teachers over
other teachers who had previously been ranked higher on the lists.40
The court's decision, however, rested upon its finding that the new
promotional procedure was not discriminatory in effect when racial
considerations were applied equally to all applicants in an effort to
select the best administrators for a school district that faced racial
problems.41
37. There is little doubt that the Gallagher court was compelled to order affirmative
relief because of actual discriminatory practices within the Minneapolis Fire Department.
As the court stated:
The absolute preference ordered by the trial court would operate as a present in-
fringement on those non-minority group persons who are equal or superiorly qualified
for the fire fighter's positions; and we hesitate to advocate implementation of one
constitutional guarantee by the outright denial of another. Yet we acknowledge the
legitimacy of erasing the effects of past racial discriminatory practices.
452 F.2d at 330.
38. Carter and the vast majority of employment cases have been brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1981 to 2000h-6 (1970), and have dealt with actual dis-
criminatory practices. See Porham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1971); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943
(1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
In Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971), also cited by the DeFunis court, the use of an Executive Order to coerce a mi-
nority quota system upon contract bidders of federal building projects was held not to be
a violation of fifth amendment due process. The history of actual racial discrimination
within the contractors association, and the unique power of the executive branch to apply
pressure through its spending power, more than distinguish this case from DeFunis.
39. 431 F.2d 1254 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971), afJ'g 302 F. Supp. 726
(D.N.J. 1969).
40. Before the procedure was revised teachers were rated for advancement on the basis
of standardized test scores; and at that time only two out of approximately fifty-five per-
sons considered for the positions of principal or vice-principal were black. The school board
eliminated the promotional tests and instigated a reviewing process whereby every appli-
cant's credentials were personally analyzed for ability to deal with the peculiar problems
of the Newark School District. 302 F. Supp. at 751-32.
41. The Porcelli court accepted, with little discussion, the school board's good faith
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Although both Porcelli and DeFunis deal with voluntary plans which
ultimately bestow a "benefit" on minority members to the detriment
of others, each case represents a distinctly different legal situation. In
Porcelli, the school board had instigated a new selection process to
determine promotions which the court was satisfied it had applied
equally to both majority and minority applicants. Within the frame-
work of this procedure, race was admittedly a factor which the board
considered, but only regarding a realistic determination of who would
be a qualified administrator to cope with the problems of a minority-
dominated school district. The Porcelli court had held that race may
be, for a compelling reason, one of several factors to be weighed in a
selection process that is equally applied to all applicants; and certainly
the extreme problems of the Newark school district would justify such
considerations of race.42
The University of Washington Law School was not faced with a
parallel problem. Whereas the Newark school board was non-discrimi-
natory in its use of the new promotional policy, the law school ad-
mittedly favored minority applicants over others.43 Had the university
applied the same admissions analysis which it used for minority students
to all of its applicants, i.e., screening each applicant's credentials sepa-
rately and weighing the social aspects and extra curricular activities
together with the LSAT scores and grade point averages, then there
would have been a situation similar to that found in Porcelli, and the
discretionary procedure of the law school admissions committee would
have been less vulnerable to attack.
Clearly, the factual situation surrounding the University of Wash-
ington's voluntary affirmative action program distinguishes it from
those cases cited by the DeFunis court. The Brown related decisions
stand for the very narrow use of racial classifications to effectively pro-
vide equal education to minority students who had formerly been
denied their rights under a de jure segregated educational system. The
motivation for changing the promotional procedure. In a school district where there were
three black students for every white, one of the basic qualifications for a satisfactory ad-
ministrator would undoubtedly be an understanding of minority educational problems.
The Newark School Board merely considered a teacher's ability to deal with the problems
of black students as one of the criteria it applied to all applicants seeking advancement.
42. The Director of Reference and Research for the Newark Board of Education, Dr.
Donald Wesley Campbell, had stated that there was somewhat of an "educational crisis"
within the district. The levels of scholastic achievement of the Newark public school stu-
dents were considerably below the national medians, and at least one expert witness seemed
to imply that the level of education for black students might improve under the guidance
of more black administrators who understood minority problems. 302 F. Supp. at 733.
43. 507 P.2d at 1175-76.
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de facto segregation cases somewhat broadened this exception to strict
equal protection, but they have merely allowed Brown's mandate to
be applied to situations where the detrimental effects of de facto segre-
gation are indistinguishable from those of de jure, and where no student
can realistically claim that he or she is being denied a "benefit" by
the implementation of affirmative action programs. The vast majority
of discrimination in employment cases are either predicated on actual
acts of discrimination or federal coercive powers.
Thus, DeFunis seems to stand apart from the mainstream of cases
both in its factual setting and its interpretation of permissible excep-
tions to equal protection. An independent state agency, the University
of Washington Law School, at its own discretion, was permitted to
deny equal protection to a number of its applicants without any show-
ing of past or present de jure or de facto discrimination within the law
school.
It is difficult to comprehend how this decision could exist as a logical
extension of those cases dealing with school desegregation or discrimi-
nation in employment. Until now, it seems, affirmative action programs
have been allowed only as restitutory measures for specific wrongs done
by the acting institution or for deprivations of rights which the institu-
tion has a constitutional duty to restore. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington has played a familiar game of judicial gymnastics; it has par-
rotted the existing concepts of fourteenth amendment guarantees, but
has nonetheless broken from the traditional restraints applicable to
suspect classifications and authored a new concept of equal protection,
the bounds of which are yet unknown.
Stewart M. Flam
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